谈谈本届超级碗最后一分多钟发生的怪事－一篇WSJ关于战术选择的分析

haowh

With a little more than a minute to go inSunday night's Super Bowl, the football game of the year got deeply weird.

With about a minuteleft, the Patriots, who were leading, stood down to let the Giants score ago-ahead touchdown. Running back Ahmad Bradshaw was so perplexed, he didn'tknow whether to spike the ball after scoring.

Then, after the Giantscommitted a seemingly dumb penalty by putting one too many players on thefield, the gaffe suddenly looked like a brilliant play by the Giants: The fiveextra yards the Patriots were given seemed far less meaningful than the eight secondsthat had ticked off the clock.

Already these two plays,which occurred within 47 seconds of one another, have entered the pantheon ofthe most controversial and complicated plays in the Super Bowl's 46-yearhistory. But after the game, even as the players shed more light on thesestrange doings, the fundamental questions remained: Were any of these movestactically sound? And what kind of impact did they have on each team's chancesof winning the game?

The statistics outfitPredictionMachine.com has used a football database to create a system that cantell you what a football team's percentage odds of winning are in any gamesituation. By looking at a team's chance of winning before any play andcomparing it to their chance of winning once the play is over, the company cangive a rough indication of how significant a play really was. After looking atthese two plays in question, and analyzing what might have happened if theteams had done things differently, a clearer picture of that wild final minutestarts to emerge.

To sum it up: The mostsignificant events of all were two decisions that weren't actually made. And inboth cases, the Patriots were the losers.

The'Free' Touchdown

Trailing 17-15 with 69seconds left, the Giants had a first down, goal to go, from the Patriots'seven-yard line. After the snap, Giants quarterback Eli Manning handed the ballto Bradshaw, who was tackled for a one-yard gain. At this point the Giants, accordingto PredictionMachine, had an 88.3% chance of winning the game.

At this point, New England coach Bill Belichick called a time out—his second of thegame—leaving the Patriots with one. He used the break to pull out a cleverpiece of strategy: Belichick told his defense to let the Giants score on thenext play. By conceding the touchdown and the lead, he figured, his offensewould have a little more time left to drive down the field and score, takingback the lead to win the game.

On the next play,Bradshaw took the handoff and saw the Patriots not making any major effort tostop him. Manning, seeing what was happening, thought for a moment that theGiants should decline the invitation to score, run another play to wind downthe clock, and then kick a field goal.

Manning yelled toBradshaw: "Don't score, don't score." Bradshaw said the advice didn'tregister until he was on the half-yardline. He tried to stop, but his momentumcarried him into the end zone.

According to thenumbers, scoring the touchdown at that point actually decreased the Giants'chances of winning the game by about three percentage points. Once Bradshawcrossed the goal line, his team had a 95.5% chance of winning. Had he stoppedshort and allowed the Giants to run one more play before kicking, the Giantswould have had a 98.1% chance of winning.

After the game,Belichick said he'd rather get the ball back and have a last possession"rather than have a game end on a kick that's well over a 90% successrate."

While Belichick won thatround, he actually missed a chance to give his team a far more significantboost. Had he figured this plan out earlier and let the Giants score on firstdown instead, quarterback Tom Brady would have gotten the ball back with 1:04left and two timeouts instead of one. In that case, the Patriots' chances ofwinning would have jumped by a more-significant six percentage points.

Incidentally, thiswasn't the first time an NFL team let an opponent score, even in the SuperBowl. The Green Bay Packers did it in 1998 with the game tied and the DenverBroncos on the verge of scoring the winning touchdown with 1:45 to play. TheBroncos took a 31-24 lead—but Green  Bay's potential game-tying drive came to nothing.

Asked about the playMonday, Giants head coach Tom Coughlin said: "You certainly don't want toleave that much time on the clock." He took responsibility for failing torealize what the Patriots were up to. "I really didn't instruct the runnernot to score," he added. In the end, though, he said, "it turned outthe right way."

TheSo-Called 'Penalty'

Forty ticks of the clocklater, the Patriots had the ball on their 44-yard line. It was a second-and-10and the Patriots needed to score a touchdown to win the game. Just before thesnap, Giants defensive end Justin Tuck realized the team had too many playerson the field and ran for the sidelines with his helmet in his hands. It was toolate.

The Patriots snapped theball and ran a play. After it was over, the Giants got whistled for having 12men on the field. The penalty: five yards for the Patriots and a repeat ofsecond down.

But here's the problem:The play itself—an incomplete pass by Brady—had burned eight seconds. And atthis point in the game, time was arguably more important than a few yards. Somethought the outcome was so favorable to the Giants that they'd done this onpurpose.

According to thenumbers, it was basically a wash. Before the play, the Patriots had an 11.5%chance to win. After it, their chances rose to 12.2%. In other words, the losttime was nearly as costly as the gained yardage was beneficial.

If anything, the playwill force the NFL to consider changing the rules so that a penalty of thisnature doesn't hurt the innocent team by taking away precious seconds.

In fact, the Patriotsmay have suffered the most from those lost seconds. Give the Patriots the ballon the 49-yard line with 17 seconds to play instead of nine and their chancesof winning would have been 20.4%, or 67% better than what they got under therules.

To add to the woes ofPatriots fans: Fox Sports' Mike Pereira, the NFL's former vice president ofofficiating, said the rules actually allow officials to give expired time backto a team if they see what is known as a "palpably unfair act."

So if the Giants had put13, 15 or 20 men on the field and forced the Patriots to run a play that never couldhave worked, the officials could have restored the time. In this case, though,they considered it an innocent mistake.

Patriots fans mightdisagree.

该贴已经同步到 haowh的微博

达阵的东北人

有人说最后那球是爱国者估计让巨人达阵的，好给自己留下更多的反攻时间。
不知道是真是假，如果是真，那台冒险了，在超级碗最后一分钟必须达阵的压力下，谁能保证一定能成功呢。
如果拼命防守，守住了会不会能好点呢。当然历史没有假设{:soso_e188:}

Creek_6

达阵的东北人 发表于 2012-2-7 16:33
有人说最后那球是爱国者估计让巨人达阵的，好给自己留下更多的反攻时间。
不知道是真是假，如果是真，那台 ...

这就跟篮球比赛还剩半分钟比分打平你手握球权，该是快打一个保证有两次进攻机会还是慢慢打一个回去尽力防守差不多道理，我觉的关键取决于你对自己的进攻有信心还是防守有信心，我相信BB在那一刻肯定还是对TB更有信心，反正防也防不住，与其丢分又耗时，还不如进攻拼一下，时间不多却也不是不能组织一次进攻，TB本场不也扔过一个进百码的传球么

tonglin8015

很想知道BB当时到底是怎么设计的。。。。。求官方及本人解释~~~

hench1014

我也同意应该放达阵，毕竟还有1分钟反攻的时间。如果不放达阵的话，让巨人耗完时间踢个任意球，那就肯定输了。

packer12

从那个达阵的过程来看  是故意放给巨人达阵的

我认为这是明智的战术选择，寄希望于巨人近距离任意球不进，或者出现失误导致球权转换是不现实和消极的做法

shanghaicq

69秒，1档达阵！！！巨人会耗到最后一秒射门的，当时射门的距离和踢附加分差不多。爱国者打得不错，运气实在糟糕，两次迫使掉球都被巨人拿回，巨人射门中柱弹入得分，格隆考夫斯基关键时刻重伤。T.B和维克太想复仇了，太想痛击巨人，领先后T.B的几次传球选择不是很好，总想传长的，一下打死巨人。维克联盟最稳定的接球手，在最不应该犯错时犯错了。心态真的很重要！！！

hahui

其实前面一次进攻就应该放了，这样自己还能剩2分钟，一次暂停，感觉小鸡有点犹豫，举旗不定

arsenal5ive

一会慢慢看。。。不过想问问大神门。。。当时看的时候我就想为嘛爱国者不赶紧让巨人td，这么下去巨人不是稳赢的么。。。只领先两分啊。。。踢个field goal不就反超了么。感觉巨人怎么着托下去赢面都是超大的，所以还不如保证他们td留给自己反攻的时间啊。   
我看的比赛还不多好多规则还都不懂，所以如果说了无知的话大神们不要介意啊。

yaksa9527

arsenal5ive 发表于 2012-2-8 01:51
一会慢慢看。。。不过想问问大神门。。。当时看的时候我就想为嘛爱国者不赶紧让巨人td，这么下去巨人不是稳 ...

关键巨人也不傻，比如跑到一码处停掉。反正也没时间限制，就耗着你。

有空的闲人

BB留给自己的时间太少了